Is Peace in Colombia Possible?

Gabriel Chaves
LIBERAL GUERRILLA
Political Liberalization, with acceptance of a MIXED ECONOMY
Became a legal political party in early 1990’s.

MARXIST,
LIBERATION THEOLOGY (MAOIST: Foco)
Is rooted in industrial sector: mining and energy.

Claim to be MARXIST-LENINIST
MAOIST: demand of the peasantry.
Is rooted in the rural sectors with low state presence.
Colombia
The Human Cost of War

• 218,000 people killed, 80%+ civilians (1958-2012).
  • 5.7 Million internally displaced (1985-2012)
  • 25,000 people disappeared (1985-2012)
Prospective of the Peace Dialogues.

• The armed conflict has not prevented increase on inequality, economic dependence, and de-industrialization.
• The insurgents have renounced to solve capitalism. Their current demands can be satisfied by the ruling class.
• The ruling class renounces their intentions of jailing or killing the guerrilla leaders.
• Both parties acknowledge the impossibility of destroying the adversary.
Reached agreement on transitional justice.
6 months for final agreement.
Topics of Discussion

Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera

General Agreement for an End to the Conflict and the Construction of an Estable and Lasting Peace

1. Model of Agrarian Development.
2. Political Participation for FARC
3. End of the Armed Conflict
5. Rights of the Victims.
6. Implementing the agreement.
1. Model of Agrarian Development.

- LAND as the cause of war: Pressure from Latifundistas.
- Solution:
  - Zonas de Reserva Campesina. (Rural Development Zones)
  - Support for farmer economy in family units.
  - Ley de Tierras. (Law of Lands for victims of dispossession.
    - Assassination of claimants.
    - Legalization of ownership achieved by force.
EL BOGOTAZO
4/9/1948
Peace Agreement - 9/15/1953
Betrayed by the government
Peace Negotiations
Extermination of UP by Right Wing Forces
Peace Dialogues 1998-2002
Seen as arrogance by FARC

2nd Point: Safeguards for political participation.
Transitional Justice Agreement

- Special Transitional Justice Court.
- Commitment to Truth as a precondition for lower penalties.
- “Restriction of Freedom”.
- No amnesty for crimes against humanity (as required by Rome Statute)
3/21/2016

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Timochenko? and Santos?
The M19 precedent
What Happens after FARC
TIMELINE OF COLOMBIAN DRUG WAR

- 82-86: Arrival of Neoliberalism: Market Liberalization, Privatization of state companies.
- 86-90: Runs against market liberalization, government tied by drug scandal very early.
- 90-94: FARC
- 94-98: MEDELLIN CARTEL, CALI CARTEL
- 98-02: NORTE DEL VALLE CARTEL
- 02-06: AUC
- 06-10: BACRIM
- 10-14: FARC
- 14-18: MercoPress

South Atlantic News Agency
President George W. Bush thanked Colombia’s President Alvaro Uribe for his support in the anti-drugs war and promised to work “intensely” to have US Congress ratify the free trade agreement between both countries.
The Current War on Drugs

Farming → Production → Commercialization → Money laundering

The weight of prohibition falls in the weakest links of the drug trade: The campesinos who grow coca, the mules that transport small amounts and the final consumer of the product.

Ernesto Samper Pizano, Colombian president 1994-1998
In: “Drogas. Prohibicion o Legalization” 2013
Lesson from Plan Colombia

What did the U.S. government learn from plan Colombia? First, that the war on drugs can be used as a mechanism to promote business-friendly policies, and second, that paramilitarism strengthened by prohibition can assist in the maintenance of control over territories and populations.

Dawn Paley, DRUG WAR CAPITALISM (2015), AK Press
70 years of FARC
More to read

• On the current peace process.
  http://socialistworker.org/2015/10/08/is-peace-in-colombia-at-hand

• A critical view of 70 years of war.
  http://socialistworker.org/2015/10/22/turning-point-in-colombia

• About the war on drugs.
  http://isreview.org/issue/90/consolidating-narco-economy